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Notes
LEX LOCI DELICTI OR SIGNIFICANT CONTACTSTHAT IS NOT THE QUESTION
INTMODUCTION

Rules of law are the language of the law. They are indispensable
only insofar as they provide a vehicle for expressing thought. Consequently, when legal principles frustrate rational solutions to problems
arising out of human activities, they should be abandoned. This
sociological jurisprudential reasoning, boldly affronting the historic
notion of stare decisis, appears today to have won more friends than
its time-worn rival. A quick glance at the field of conflicts of law
provides ample support for this conclusion. With unprecedented
unanimity, conflicts scholars are clamoring for sweeping revisions of
the choice of law rules; but with unparalleled discord, none can agree
as to the form these revisions should take.1
Nevertheless, it is the purpose of this writing not to swim in this
current of diversity, but to postulate still another reform. At the
outset, however, it must be noted that the scope of this note has
been purposefully restricted to injuries to tangible things. This is
done in an effort to abstain from generalities and to accommodate
the writer's conviction that social policies underlying various kinds
of torts differ, which, translated, means desirable results may not
always obtain by applying the same choice of law rule to every
kind of tort.2 Yet, it must be observed that this narrow treatment
is not meant to encase the following hypothesis within iron-clad
boundaries. Contrarily, it is hoped the following proposal can find
uniform application in every multi-state tort situation, if it is the
consensus that such can be done without perverting common sense.
Lxx Loci Daurir
The principle generally recognized today as the traditional tort
choice of law rule had its decisional origin in 1880. The United
1
See, e.g., Cavers, The Two Local Law Theories, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 881
(1951); Currie, Notes, Methods and Obiectives in the Conflicts of Laws, 1959
Duke L.J. 171; Ehrenzweig, Conflicts of Laws 309 (1962); New Trends in the
Conflict
of Laws, 28 Law & Contemp. Prob. 673-869 (1963).
2
E.g., interference with the marriage relationship, alienation of parent's
affections, and interference with contractual relationship possibly may better be

(Continued on next page)
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States Supreme Court, in Dennick v. Railroad Co.,3 held to be applicable the wrongful death statute of the state in which a right of
action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred. This concept
came to be known as the "vested rights doctrine." Beale, using vested
rights as his base, developed a formula whereby torts were governed
by the law of the "place of the wrong."4 It was early demonstrated
that the "place of the wrong" theory needed refinement in order to
sufficiently contend with those instances in which the place of the
conduct and the place of the injury were not coincident. In those
situations the question left unresolved by Beale's formula waswhere was the place of the wrong? Some courts and noted authorities expressed the place of the wrong in terms of conduct. 5 Beale did
not share this view, for he considered the place of the wrong to be
"the place where the person or thing harmed is situated at the time
of the wvrong."6 In short, he theorized that the law of the place of
the injury was determinative. His thinking was adopted by the first
Restatement7-not at all peculiar considering he was the reporteras evidenced by section 377 which provided, "the place of the wrong
is in the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable
for an alleged tort takes place." s
The Restatement's posture for nearly two decades received almost
uncritical judicial acceptance." It was not until 1963, that the New
York court in Babcock v. Jackson'° unequivocally disavowed-1 the
place of injury concept. Shortly thereafter, Pennsylvania followed
the lead in Griffith v. United Air Line, Inc.12 Other courts disingenuously, by one artifice or another, have also sought relief from
the mechanical rigors of lex loci. Nonetheless, the place of the injury rule can still be said to reflect present law, at least in the area
of negligent torts. 13
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

dealt with by a choice of law rule other than the one about to be prosposed.

3 103 U.S. 11 (1880).

4 Beale, A Treatise on the Conflicts of Laws or Private International Law
(1916).
GConnecticut Valley Lumber Co. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 78 N.H. 553, 103
Ad. 263 (1918); Ehrenzweig, supra note 1 at 546.
G2 Beale, Conflict of Laws § 377.2 (1935).
7Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934).

81bid.
9Ehrenzweig, supra note 1, at 545.

10 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
11But c.f., Murphy v. Barron, 23 A pp. Div. 2d 732, 2.58 N.Y.S.21 139
(1965); Long v. Pan American World Airlines, Inc., 23 App. *Diir. 2d 386, 260
N.Y.S.2d 750 (1965).
12416 Pa. 1,203 A.2d 796 (1964).
13 It appears that some courts prefer to apply the law of the place of con(Continued on next page)
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SICNMuICAT CONTACIS

As early as 1924, the vested rights concept became the target of
Lorenzen's well-aimed darts. 1 4 He provided the catalyst from which
criticism has flowed ever since. 15 The doctrine's mechanistic approach
in an area of sociological jurisprudence accounts for much of this.
However, philosophic notions aside, it is also true that lex loci has
occasioned at times harsh and irrational results,' which are primarily
attributable to the rapid technological advances society has experienced in the air and motor transportation industries. Widespread
utilization of these high-speed modes of travel unquestionably has
created a more fluid society. This mobility has increased the number
of multi-state torts while at once enlarging the possibility of the
place of injury being totally fortuitous-fortuitious in the sense that
the state where the injury occurred has no significant relationship
whatsoever with the parties or the occurrence. Sometimes, the only
nexus the state where the injury occurred has with the parties and
occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the injury
occurred there.
To remedy the mechanical and periodically irrational results
of the place of the injury doctrine, myriad formulas have been contrived, all of which proceed to summarily reject the old doctrine
in favor of the suggested proposal. Out of those formulas contending
for mastery, but one has received judicial sanction.' 7 This is known
variously as the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine. The adoption of this alternative was preluded by a series of
cases in which the courts, by one rationale or another, avoided inexorable application of lex loci.' The courts in each of these cases
examined the particular circumstances presented and applied the
law of some jurisdiction other than the place of the injury because
it had a more compelling interest in the application of its law to
the legal issue involved. But it was not until the New York court in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

duct in cases of intentional torts-especially when the forum is the place of the
conduct and there eists forum liability as opposed to foreign non-liability. See
Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multi-state Torts: Law and
Reason versus the Restatement, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 5-6 (1951).
14 Lorenzen, Territoriity, Public Policy, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 Yale
L.J. 736 (1924).
15Cook, Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942); see also,
supra note 1.
'6Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Civ. App. Tex. 1953).
17 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith v.
United8 Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
' Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Acc. Comm., 294 U.S. 532
(1935); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Schmidt v.
'Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
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Babcock, followed a year later by the Pennsylvania court in Griffith, that the place of the injury doctrine was candidly repudiated.
It could not have been made clearer, than when the Babcock court
averred:
The 'center of gravity' or 'grouping of contacts' doctrine adopted by
this court in conflicts cases involving contracts impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort cases with multi-state contacts. Justice, fairness
and 'the best practical result' [citation omitted] may best be achieved by
giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because
of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. The
merit of such a rule is that 'it gives to the place '"aving the most
interest in the problem" paramount control over the legal issues arising
out of a particular factual context' and thereby allows the forum
to apply 'the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with
the outcome of the particular litigation.' 9

With equal clarity, the Grith court declared:
After careful review and consideration of the leading authorities and
cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci delicti rule should
be abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a more flexible rule which
and interests underlying the particular
permits analysis of policies
20
issue before the court.

To add to the support of the "grouping of contacts" approach, the
second Restatement2' has officially adopted it and has eulcidated the
doctrine, about as well as it can be, in section 379, which provides:
1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights
and liabilities in tort.
2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the
state of the most significant relationship include:
a) the place where the injury occurred,
b) the place where the conduct occurred,
c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.
3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the forum
will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the relevant
purposes of the tort rules [involved].

The Reporters comments on section 379 reveal that the importance

to be ascribed to various contacts corresponds with the order in
which they have been listed and also that the listed contacts are not
19 191 N.E.2d at 283.
20 203 A.2d at 805.
21 Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
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exclusive, but rather the courts will consider any contact which can
reasonably be said to be of significance in connecting the occurrence
and the parties with a given state.
While the Restatement readily evinces that the new methodology
is gaining momentum, it still must be asserted that the traditional
concept represents the overwhelming weight of authority, despite
the Restatement and the fact that two outstanding courts have
aligned themselves in the opposite camp and have been joined by
still others who have circuitously done so.m2
LEx Loci DEucr versus SIGNICANT CoNTAcrs
As previously remarked, war was declared on the traditional rule
in 1924.23 It has raged with increasing ferocity from that time,2a with
the champions of the significant contacts theory remorselessly clamoring for the demise of lex loci. Not undaunted, the die-hard paladins
of the traditional method,25 unwilling to make concessions, have
entrenched and seemingly are prepared for a protracted conflict.
Anomalously, both sides claim rationality to be their devastating
weapon. Before any attempt can be made to restore peace to the
strife-torn conflict of laws territory, it appears necessary to subject
both factions to a scrutinous review. The traditionalists" site will be
examined first.
The North Carolina court in Shaw v. Lee refractorily rejected any
rule other than the traditional one, refusing "to voyage into such an
uncharted sea, leaving behind well established conflict of law rules." 2 6
Sparks, a Missouri practitioner, addressing himself to the Babcock decision, dogmatically declared it to be "wholly indefensible,"
further adding,
[Tlhat the Babcock opinion will throw the law governing torts into
a state of utter confusion, will bring forth a hodge podge of decisions
based neither on rhyme nor reason, will breed uncertainty, will encourage forum shopping by the parties, will increase provincialism
2
Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953); Haumschild
v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959); see also,
supra23note 18.
Lorenzen supra note 14.
24
Cook supra note 15; Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem,
47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1983); Morris, supra note 1; Cheatham and Reese,
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 959 (1952); Ehrenzweig,
The Most Significant Relationship in the Conflicts of Law of Torts, 28 Law &
Contemp.
Prob. 700 (1963).
25
Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963); McDaniel v. Sinn,
194 Kan. 625, 400 P.2d 1018 (1965); Sparks, Babcock v. Jackson-A Practicing

Attorne's Reflections Upon the Opinion and Its Implications, 31 Ins. Counsel

J. 428 (1964).
26129 S.E.2d at 293.
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throughout this federalized
country and will allow recovery solely that
27
one might recover.

Basically, Sparks' arrows are shot from the bow of thought that
the center of gravity concept is devoid of those virtues generally
conceded to inhere in the place of the injury doctrine. Let us examine
this position.
In the first place, it is indubitable that the place of injury rule
insures a uniform result. Anyone injured in a mishap involving
multiple parties can be assured, under the traditional approach that
any claim he might asssert will be treated in accordance with the
exact same law as other claims asserted by fellow parties. The beauty
of this feature is that all parties will be treated similarly. If the
parties were subjected to the vagaries of varying statutes some might
recover and others might not despite identical grievances. This, it
appears, would do violence to the historic notions of fair play and
substantial justice. Appropriately, the place of the injury rule precludes such an occurrence. However, the competing doctrine, by its
very terms, encourages dissimilar results, in that significant contacts
may vary from party
to party thus warranting application of dif28
ferent states' laws.
In addition, the place of the injury formula guarantees an objective result. Objectivity, hopefully the hallmark of every judicial
tribunal, obtains because the traditional view is not susceptible to
intrusions of local influence and/or judicial caprice. Those jurists
who harbor the provincial notion that the forum's law represents the
only proper solution to controversies, are not afforded the opportunity to judicially sanction such notions under lex loci, whereas the
malleability of the alternative doctrine invites the ills of subjectivity
and provincialism, in that the grouping of the contacts approach
empowers the court to group those contacts it deems significant,
thus providing a ready vehicle for manipulation and exploitation
in favor of the forum law.
Moreover, the place of the injury doctrine, havings its conceptual
foundation in the vested rights theory, fixes the rights and liabilities
of the parties at the moment the tort occurs. This lends certainty and
predictability, while at once deterring forum shopping and unwarranted litigation.
27 Sparks, supra note 25, at 428.

2

8 Compare, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d
526 (1961) with Core v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 222 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.
1963). Admittedly, Kilberg turned on the procedure-substance dichotomy, but
grouping of contacts rationale was the controlling influence.
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Certainty stems from the fact that the applicable law does not
depend for its existence upon the "wisdom" of the court in grouping
and appraising the contacts, but rather is simply determined by an
objective test which the legal practitioner can apply well in advance
of litigation. This allows the practitioner to know immediately upon
consultation by a client which state's law will govern. Without conjecture, he can accurately evaluate the case and better advise the
client. This in turn generates predictability, for an attorney, in
knowing which state's law will govern, is positioned to predict the
outcome of any future litigation. Of course, if the anticipated outcome
is unfavorable to the client or at least questionable, the attorney will
caution the client to effect an out-of-court settlement. This provides
the gratuitous yet salutary by-product of alleviating the burdensomely
over-crowded conditions of the courts. In addition, the immutability
of the rights and liabilities under the place of the injury theory establishes a bastion against forum shopping, in that irrespective of which
forum is selected the rights and liabilities of the parties remain the
same. Consequently, the inducement to shop for a forum is virtually
eliminated.
On the other hand, the successor theory spawns uncertainty in
that few, if any, are sufficiently Solomon-like to know in a given
factual context what a given court will determine to be the applicable state law. As a result, predictability will falter, forum
shopping will flourish and litigation will cascade into the courts.
Furthermore, a factor that must not be overlooked is that the
historic method provides the courts with a tool that can be easily
employed, since the place of the injury almost invariably depends
upon factors readily discernible. The alternative device, however,
is abstrusely and complexly articulated and as a consequence, is difficult to apply. Its complexity is compounded by the careful refrain of the courts employing it from enunciating a standard by
the relawhich significant contacts can be determined and by2 which
9
tive significance of these contacts can be appraised
. The traditionalists further buttress their position by aptly underscoring that there are times when two or more states will have equal
interests in the decision of the case. If so, the policy of significant
contacts offers little assistance in the determination of the choice
of law issue. It is urged that the designed flexibility of the new concept infects the law with chaos, for almost any result a court might
choose to reach can superficially be justified by the grouping of
29

But c.f., Restatement, supra note 21, at comment b and c.

. NoT s
contacts approach. Recovery for the sake of recovery will in essence
become the rule, insofar as forums under the new system could
handily be solicitous of the welfare of its citizens at the expense
of less-needy citizens or insurance companies. In sum, it is insisted
that the flexible counterpart to ex loci delicti invites anarchy.
On this note, it becomes time to explore the defenses of those in
their pitched camps on the other side of the battle zone. Apparently
obliviovs to the volley of spears hurled by the traditionalists, the
progressives assail the opposition as anachronists-the belated products of medieval scholasticism.3 0 They scornfully deride the traditionalists as being blind to that wvidely-accepted philosophic jurisprudential idea that problems of law are problems of social engineering and not of mechanical logic. The progressives mercilessly
foray by underlining the fact that social engineering is impossible in
an atmosphere of static, inflexible rules which fail to take account
of the social, economic and practical considerations of justice, which
more or less directly bear upon technical law. What's more, the
exponents of the new methodology continue by declaring that uniformity and certainty are not the sole ends to be attained and that
ease of application and predictability are insufficient reasons to
perpetuate an unsound rule.
"The vice of the vested rights theory is that it affects to decide
concrete cases upon generalities which do not state the practical
considerations involved."3 ' More particularly, it is maintained that the
place of the injury theory "ignores the interest which jurisdictions
other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolution of
particular issues."3 2
With force and logic, Chief Justice Desmond of the Nev York
Court of Appeals addressed himself to the shortcomings of the traditional rule:
Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States through
An air traveler from New York may
and over which they move ....
in a flight of a few hours' duration pass [over many commonwealths].
His plane may meet with disaster in a State he never intended to cross
but into which the plane has flown because of bad weather or other
unexpected developments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent may
The place of injury becomes
begin in one State and end in another.
33
entirely fortuitous. [Emphasis added.]
30

Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 Yale L.J.

468 (1928).

31
Id. at 482-83.
32
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 (1963).
33
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526,

527 (1961).
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The Pennsylvania court in Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., artfully
rebutted the traditionalists' contention that the center of gravity
system foments chaos:
It must be emphasized that this approach [grouping of contacts] to
choice of law will not be chaotic and anti-rational. 'The alternative
to a hard and fast system of doctrinal formulae is not anarchy. The
difference is not between a system and no system, but between two
systems; between a system which purports to have, but lacks, complete
logical symmetry and one which affords latitude for the interplay and
clash of conflicting policy factors.' [citations omitted.] Moreover, in
evaluating qualitatively the policies underlying the significant relationships to the controversy, our standard will be no less clear than the
concepts of 'reasonableness'
or 'due process' which courts have evolved
84
over many years.

Without further discourse, it becomes manifest that the myriad
forays across the battleline have raised from the bowels of the arena
a dust-cloud that has obfuscated rather than enlightened. Through
the opaque haze billowed up by the plethora of arguments and
counter-arguments, there lucidly emerges but these uncontested
facts: 1) the place of the injury rule is possessed of certainty, uniformity of result, predictability, ease of application, and other desirable traits; 2) the fluidity of twentieth-century society allows for
situations in which the place of injury is entirely fortuitous; 3) the
place of the injury rule, blind to the interests of any state other than
the place of the injury, leads to harsh and irrational results when the
place of the injury is fortuitous; and 4) the flexible significant contacts doctrine, although besest with numerous frailties, is equipped
to handle those situations in which the place of injury is fortuitous.
To re-establish harmony to the embattled conflict of laws area, it
appears necessary to effectuate a methodology that will sufficiently
take cognizance of the foregoing enumerated facts.
MA

.GE
OF TH Two Docrsm

An arbiter attempting to effect a satisfactory compromise between
warring factious must approach the task with a view to the best of
both sides from which he must borrow in order to forge an acceptable solution. So also must it be done here.
This eclectic process may be properly commenced by distillating that which is desirable from the traditional rule. Since the blackletter traditional rule is incontrovertibly endowed with simplicity,
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, besides serving as
34 203 A.2d at 806.
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a deterrent to forum shopping and unwarranted litigation, it appears that it should be preserved in some form. It is equally true,
however, that the wooden application of the doctrine leads to a
sacrifice of justice, fairness and the best practical result when the place
of injury is fortuitous. Consequently, it is apparent that the rule
should not be preserved without modification as the traditionalists
would have it.
Unlike the traditional rule, the newly ordained concept, giving
effect to that state's law which has the most significant relationship
with the parties and the occurrence, can justly and fairly treat those
situations in which the place of injury is fortuitous. In this respect,
the doctrine is most desirable and should be utilized in some form.
Yet the doctrine is handcuffed with numerous shortcomings-complexity, uncertainty, unpredictability, disparity in results, inadequacy
in cases where competing governmental interests are equal, besides
inducing forum shopping, unwarranted litigation and provincialism.
Viewed in this light, surely it should not receive carte blanche acceptance as the unqualified successor of the traditional approach, as
the progressives would have it.
Observed in its proper perspective, neither method is self-sufficient. But fortunately, the assets of the traditional rule compensate for the liabilities of its competitor and vice versa. The doctrines
are complementary, and therefore can peacefully co-exist. They are
not mutually exclusive; they are not antitheticals.
It is submitted, that the virtues of lex loci command its continuance, but not without exception. The ineptitude of the tradiional rule in dealing with those situations in which the place of injury is fortuitous and the facility with which grouping of contacts
does resolve these situations clearly evinces that the center of gravity
approach should be engrafted upon the traditional doctrine as an
exception 5 to be applied when the place of the injury is fortuitous.
Surely, justice, fairness and the best practical result should be the
product of every adjudication. When these goals can be assured in
combination with the desirable traits of lex loci and in the absence of
the difficulties of the grouping of contacts, with what persuasion can
it be maintained that this should not be done? Yet, to summarily discard the place of the injury doctrine, by implication, suggests just
that. In the preponderance of the multi-state tort cases, the place of
35 There are presently two well-settled exceptions to the plac of the injury
rule: 1) the forum need not apply the procedural law of the place of the injury,
and 2) the forum need not apply the substantive law of the place of the injury
when the policy underlying the foreign law is contrary to a deep-rooted public

policy of the forum.
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the injury and the tortious conduct coincide in a place that cannot
be properly considered fortuitous. Consequently, application of the
historic rule in those cases would not do violence to justice, fairness
and the best practical result. Only when the place of the injury is
fortuitous does the traditional rule run afoul the notions of fair play;
thus only in those circumstances should it be abandoned in favor of
the complementary grouping of contacts doctrine. It is submitted that
the old mansion need not be visited by the wrecking crews, but rather
it needs only that remodelling that will enable it to accommodate the
mobile twentieth-century.
Repeated references have been made to the term "fortuitous"
without attempting to affix a legal definition. By "fortuitous" in the
legal sense, it is meant that the party involved in the multi-state tort
had no intention to come to rest within the state where the injury
occurred. When the tortiously aggrieved party is injured while in
transitu and has not voluntarily undertaken to live and regulate his
daily life for a period of time, exceeding at least a twenty-four hour
period, within the state in which the injury occurred, then the place
of the injury is fortuitous. In such a circumstance, the injured party
should neither be entitled to the protections, nor subjected to the
disabilities of that state's law. Consequently, the traditional rule
should be abandoned in favor of the grouping of contacts exception.
An injured party clearly demonstrates an intention to come to
rest within the place of injury if he sustains the injury during the
course of a six-week training program, 38 during the course of a one
week vacation,3 7 or during the course of a weekend fishing or hunting trip. The phrase "during the course of" presupposes that the
travelling party has arrived at the state to which he intended to come
to rest for his business, vacation or sport purposes. The "intention
to come to rest" test provides the courts with a simple tool with
which to readily determine whether the traditional rule or the grouping of contacts exception applies. Doubtless, close questions will
arise as to whether or not a party intended to come to rest. These
questions should be resolved easily and simply by the courts' indulging the presumption that the injured party had intended to
come to rest, thus justifying application of the traditional rule. It
would then be incumbent upon the party seeking application of the
exceptional center of gravity approach to rebut the presumption by
clearly demonstrating he was, infact, in transitu, with no intention to
come to rest within the state of injury. Surely the onus of this require38

6Dym v. Cordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965).
87 Macy v. Rozbicki, 23 App. Div. 2d 532, 256 N.Y.S.2d. 202 (1965).
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ment is not unduly burdensome, for it should be relatively easy for a
Kentucky party or his representative, for example, to establish that
he was merely driving through the state of Georgia, where the injury occurred, on the way to a vacation in Florida; or that he was
merely spending the day shopping in Cincinnati, Ohio, where the injury occurred, intending to return home that evening to one of the
northern Kentucky communities; or that the plane routed to New
York for a business trip tragically dropped out of the sky into Pennsylvania. Of course, all of these situations present examples in
which the place of injury is fortuitous, in that the injured party was
in transitu, and all these examples should be susceptible of easy
proof.
Further clarification of when an injury is fortuitous can be made
by exploring more fully the foregoing hypothetical in which the
Kentuckian was traveling by air to New York on business. If the
plane's tragic descent occurred in New York, where the party had
voluntarily undertaken to go for a period of time exceeding at least
a twenty-four hour period, then the place of the injury should not
be classified as fortuitous, despite the fact that semantical purists
would argue that technically the party had not come to rest within
New York. What actually controls is the party's intention, although
almost invariably the party's intention can be demonstrated by the act
of coming to rest within a state. When a party intends to temporarily quit his domicile and to take up temporary residence elsewhere
for whatever reason, he should be subject to that other state's substantive law from the time he enters within the boundary of that
state to the time he re-crosses the boundary out of the state. This
means that if on the Kentuckian's return trip, after a safe arrival, his
plane crashes in New York on its way out of the state the place
of the injury is still not fortuitous and the traditional rule applies.
Should the plane fall in Ohio on the return trip, the place of the
injury would again be fortuitous; thus the exception would apply.
In the former example, the injured party had previously intended
to come to rest within New York and had done so; consequently he
is subject to New York law until he has completely removed himself
from within the state's boundaries, and in the latter the injured
party had no intention to come to rest within Ohio, so the place of
injury was entirely fortuitous.
Although on the surface the proposed marriage of the two doctrines is novel, it is suggested that the New York courts have unwittingly, through confusion and disharmony, maneuvered themselves into a position somewhat akin to the proposal. In Dym v.
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Gordon, the court, while scrupulously adhering to the Babcock
rationale, frankly stated: "Of compelling importance in this case is
the fact that here the parties had come to rest in the State of Colorado and had thus chosen to live their daily lives under the protective arm of Colorado law."3 8 The court distinguished Babcock, in
that in Babcock the New Yorkers at all times were in transitu3 9 The
Dym court, if it had employed the suggested technique of this
writing, would have arrived at precisely the same result without
squandering precious judicial time and energy by finding it necessary to first:
[I]solate the issue, next to identify the policies embraced in the laws
in conflict, and finally to examine'the contacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain which has superior connection with the occurrence
and thus40 would have a superior interest in having its policy or law
applied.

Curiously, two intermediate New York decisions, in patently restricting Babcock to its facts, inadvertently support the foregoing
proposal. One court intoned that "Babcock did not, except in the
limited sense indicated by the case itself, disavow or repudiate the
traditional vested rights doctrine,"41 while the court in Long v. Pan
American World Airlines, Inc., sharply averred:
It is contended by plaintiffs that the so-called 'grouping of contacts'
or 'center of gravity rule' entirely supersedes the traditional rule and
that the latter is no longer in any respect viable. We believe that this
contention represents counsel's hope rather than the2 law as found and
runs counter to what has been specifically decided.4

It could be no more graphically demonstrated that even within the
supposed citadel of the grouping of contacts doctrine the war between the two doctrines is being hotly waged. But more importantly, it is apparent that while many jurists manning the New York
courts are unwilling to accept Babcock as a blanket rule supplanting
the traditional concept, they are willing to concede that Babcock rep.resents an exception to be engrafted upon the traditional view. In
this respect, these jurists support the formula proposed in this
writing.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the proposed marriage of the
two doctrines can best satisfy the needs of the twentieth-century
38

16 N.Y.2d at

a9 Ibid.

125, 209 N.E.2d at 795.

40 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794.

41Murphy v. Barron, 23 App. Div. 2d 782, 258 N.Y.S.2d 139, 143 (1965).
42 260 N.Y.S.2d 750, 752 (1965).
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tort choice of law rule, while at once restoring tranquility to the
embattled conflict of laws area. Thus Justice Traynor 43 can finally
be answered-this conflict is NOT really necessary for there is no
reason why the two doctrines cannot be married and live happily
until the advances of society once again command a change.
Laurence W. Grause
4

3 Traynor, Is This Conflict Realy Necesary?, 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657 (1959).

